Mickaël Salaün
Mickaël Salaün is a kernel developer and open source enthusiast. He is mainly interested in Linux-based operating systems, especially from a security point of view. He has built security sandboxes before hacking into the kernel on a new LSM called Landlock, of which he is now the maintainer. He previously worked for the French national cybersecurity agency (ANSSI) on systems hardening. He is currently employed by Microsoft to work on Linux-related security projects.
Session
Landlock is an unprivileged kernel feature that enables all Linux users to sandbox their processes. Complementary to seccomp, developers can leverage Landlock to restrict their programs in a fine-grained way. While Landlock can be used by end users through sandboxer tools, there is currently no well-integrated solution to define security policies tailored to system services. Although AppArmor and seccomp security policies can already be tied to a system unit, we aim to provide a more dynamic, standalone, and unprivileged option with Landlock.
In this talk, we'll briefly explain what Landlock is and highlight its differences from other Linux security features (e.g., namespaces, seccomp, other LSMs). We'll then focus on the new configuration format we are designing for Landlock security policies, its characteristics, and how it could extend systemd units by taking into account runtime context (e.g., XDG variables).